Container lines began testing the Suez route in early 2026, aiming to return vessels to the Red Sea. They moved their first Asia-to-Europe services back to Red Sea sailings in mid-February, provided security remained stable. That stability, however, is unclear on the western corridor, where about 700 kilometers of Sudanese coastline is controlled by a government that depends on foreign weapons. The primary suppliers include Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China.
Port Sudan became the seat of this government after Khartoum fell in 2023. That makes the coastline the key to supply and survival. The coast is the region’s most valuable trade asset, acting as the main entry point for goods and diplomacy.
Smuggling and Smiles
Arms and Smuggling Threats
The U.S. Department of Justice charged an Iranian national in April 2026 with brokering a deal exceeding $70 million. This arrangement included the sale of Mohajer-6 drones to the Sudanese military, bomb fuses for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and payments funneled through an Omani company.
The smuggling network operates both directions. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has tracked a smuggling route between Sudan and Yemen since 2023. In its October 2025 report, the panel noted the Houthis as the main controllers of this smuggling after increased interdiction in the Arabian Sea. The Houthis have filled the gap left by tighter naval patrols.
Analysts at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies have identified a route connecting Port Sudan with Al Salif in Hodeidah governorate in Yemen. They observed that the Yemeni coast guard intercepted multiple shipments leaving Sudan in 2025. Their findings suggest growing cooperation between the two regions, though definitive evidence remains limited.
Strategic Naval Interests
In March 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran had requested a permanent naval base in Sudan. Both governments denied the claim. These reports highlight how access to the coast has become a strategic asset for foreign powers.
The pattern of coastal access is more telling than any single agreement. For a government under siege, offering access to the coast is a way to trade for weapons. This doesn’t necessarily mean the coast becomes a battlefield, but it could develop into one over time.
A government reliant on its own harbor has little incentive to let that harbor become a war zone. The immediate risk involves resupply and logistics, not missile launches. However, the potential for escalation is real, especially if tensions between regional actors rise.
Escalation Risks and Geopolitical Tensions
The Yemeni case provides a clear example of how trade routes can evolve into launch platforms. At Port Sudan’s latitude, the main shipping lane runs about 150 kilometers offshore. It is within the reach of systems Iran already exports. That would place the threat directly north of the Bab al-Mandab strait, an area once considered safe for maritime traffic.
Underwriters base their rates on entire shipping corridors, not for individual coastlines. If two shores are in dispute, those corridors become risky. Asian shippers have shouldered the largest impact. By May 2025, Suez transits were down to about 70 percent of their 2023 level, as reported by the UN Review of Maritime Transport. Voyages connecting East and South Asia to Europe now take 10 to 15 additional days, with the highest costs falling on Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and South Korean carriers.
The monitoring system has not kept pace with current developments. The Security Council’s Sudan arms embargo, based on Resolution 1591, still applies only to Darfur. That 2005 mandate was designed for a land-based conflict in the west. It has not been updated to reflect the maritime and coastal realities of today. Extending the scope of investigation to include national maritime activity would be a clear improvement. At the very least, the Panel of Experts should be tasked with reporting on all movements into Port Sudan by sea and air.