U.S.
The UAE now relies on nuclear energy to provide about 25% of its electricity. In contrast, the Saudi deal does not require Saudi Arabia to forgo its nuclear enrichment ambitions. Leaving the door open for the establishment of an enrichment facility in the kingdom. The Trump administration has yet to formally send to Congress the nuclear cooperation agreement it signed with Saudi Arabia last month. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a Section 123 agreement – the legal step that allows American companies to share nuclear technology with another country – in Riyadh on July 22.
Saudi Arabia's Enrichment Ambitions
Under the terms of the agreement, Riyadh could host a potential black-box enrichment facility, managed by U.S. companies but physically located within Saudi Arabia. This is a country where the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has publicly stated that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons as soon as Iran does. The U.S. has replaced the Additional Protocol, a globally recognized measure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, with a new bilateral inspection framework. This change marks a retreat from the rigorous standards that Washington has long advocated for other nations to adopt. A full assessment is still impossible. The text of the agreement has not been published, nor have two side letters that accompany it. Most of what is known comes from briefings the Energy Department has given reporters. What is known is this: once in force, the deal defers the central question to a study. There’ll be a two-year study on, well, is the making of nuclear fuel by enriching uranium really all that economical for Saudi Arabia. If the study says yes, American firms would build an enrichment plant on Saudi soil, operating under U.S. oversight. If the study says no, the agreement somehow will bind the Saudis to not get enrichment from anyone else for 10 years, citing reporting on two side letters that have not been made public. A separate side agreement would limit Saudi reactor purchases to Westinghouse — a company headquartered in Pennsylvania but owned by two Canadian firms.
The timing of the agreement is not coincidental. The U.S. and Israel launched a concerted campaign against Iran in February. Hoping to ensure greater security for Gulf monarchies. However, the campaign has instead revealed how vulnerable those Arab states are. To shifts in American and Israeli policy. The message has been clear: the security of these nations is not guaranteed. And American or Israeli actions can suddenly disrupt their stability. As a result, Washington is attempting to rebuild confidence through the nuclear deal. Offering Saudi Arabia reactors and enrichment options as a form of compensation. For the uncertainty that the regional conflict has introduced.
Criticism and Strategic Concerns
Critics argue that the agreement is more about damage control than strategic alignment. By granting Saudi Arabia access to nuclear technology that the U.S. once resisted for other countries, the deal undermines the credibility of Washington as a leader in global nonproliferation efforts. The same strict framework that helped ensure compliance from the UAE appears to be selectively ignored in the case of Saudi Arabia. This discrepancy raises questions about the consistency of U.S. policy and its commitment to maintaining a nonproliferation regime it has long championed. The administration has also complicated its own deal. A day after the signing, President Trump posted on Truth Social that Saudi Arabia would not be allowed to enrich uranium, and that the entire arrangement depended on Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords and establishing relations with Israel. Those conditions do not appear in what the two governments actually signed, Sokolski told MBN. I’m with the Saudis on this. I think they’ve got it right, which is: you’ve got to be kidding. We signed documents. They didn’t have anything in it about these other conditions. It is not part of the deal. Saudi Arabia has said repeatedly that it will not normalize relations with Israel unless Israel agrees to Palestinian statehood — a condition Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused. Sokolski noted that the president retains one lever regardless: even after the agreement takes effect, he can decline to approve nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia. He has that power. But it’s not something that he’s legally bound to do. It’s something that’s executive discretion, he said.
Iran, a country that has endured extensive economic sanctions, sabotage, and military threats over its nuclear program. Now observes a rival — Saudi Arabia — being granted the same enrichment capabilities. Without facing the same level of scrutiny. For Tehran, the rationale to hold back from developing a nuclear weapon is weakened. By the sight of Washington treating Saudi nuclear ambitions as a matter for cooperation. Rather than resistance. As a result, the long-standing nuclear monopoly held by Israel is at risk. If Israel senses its military advantage diminishing, it may feel compelled to take preemptive action. Much like it did in February. This could turn the current conflict over Iran’s nuclear ambitions into the starting point. Of a larger, more complex regional confrontation. A departure from the “gold standard” The agreement breaks with the terms Washington set for the United Arab Emirates in 2009 – an arrangement so strict it became known as the “gold standard.” Abu Dhabi made a legal commitment to forgo both uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel, the two most direct pathways to a nuclear weapon. It also accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, an inspection regime that lets IAEA monitors examine nuclear-related sites a country has not formally declared. Saudi Arabia has agreed to neither. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the forswearing did not occur at all. Worse, they did not agree to the Additional Protocol — which raises the question: do they have something to hide, or do they think they will? 144 countries – almost all the countries in the world – have agreed to the Additional Protocol. Not Saudi Arabia. Supporters of the deal argue that American oversight of a Saudi facility is better than pushing Riyadh toward Russia or China, which might offer looser terms. Sokolski is skeptical that American control would survive contact with reality. We have this expression in the United States: possession is 90 percent of the law. If you have something on your soil, you can always tell the Americans to leave. And there you go – you have it, he said. A declared facility, he added, does nothing to rule out a covert program – especially without the Additional Protocol, which exists precisely to let inspectors chase undeclared activity.
Questions About Energy Needs
There is also a fundamental question that Washington appears reluctant to address with Saudi Arabia. The claim that the nuclear program is driven by genuine energy needs. Is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Saudi Arabia is home to some of the largest oil reserves. In the world and has access to some of the most powerful solar energy resources available. These renewable options could meet the kingdom’s energy needs for decades. Without the need for nuclear enrichment. For 20 years, the U.S. scrutinized Iran’s nuclear program with great intensity. Now, that same level of skepticism seems absent when it comes to Riyadh. A nonproliferation policy that applies strict interrogation to one nation. While granting another free rein through a mere signature is not about intent, but about loyalty.