U.S. eyes Saudi nuclear contracts but lacks execution power
The U.S. Department of Energy signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia on July 22. Known as a 123 agreement, it allows American firms to join Saudi nuclear projects. Westinghouse is likely to benefit, as its AP1000 reactors might be chosen. The deal gives U.S. companies better access to Saudi projects. However, the terms are not yet public.
The U.S. cannot build large nuclear projects alone, experts say. Washington will probably rely on Korean firms for building and parts. This may push Korea out of a market where it already has strong deals and technical rights.
Korea’s long-standing role in regional nuclear projects
Kepco and KHNP won a major 2009 contract to build four APR1400 reactors in the UAE for about $16 billion. The project showed Korea’s ability to deliver large projects on time and on budget. The APR1400 design is based on earlier Westinghouse tech. An IP dispute was settled in January 2025, giving Korea export rights in certain regions.
Under the 2025 deal, Korea must pay $650 million in services and $175 million in licensing fees per reactor. Korea retained Middle East export rights. However, the U.S.-Saudi agreement could override those terms. If the AP1000 is selected, Korea may feel wronged and lose the Saudi market.
Why the U.S. still needs Korean support
The U.S. wants to expand in the Saudi nuclear market but can’t build reactors alone. Experts say Russia and China dominate global reactor exports. Russia has 34 reactors and 5 under construction. China has 60 reactors and 37 under construction. However, diplomatic issues and design problems may stop the U.S. from working with them.
France is another option, but its costs are high and it has a poor delivery record. Korean companies are the most cost-effective. In 2024, Korean per-kilowatt costs were $3,571, compared to $5,833 for the U.S. and $7,931 for France. This cost advantage and track record make Korean firms the best choice for big projects.
Professor Cho Hong-chong of Dankook University said, “Korea remains the only newcomer to complete four reactors on time and on budget — the only firm with that track record globally.” This may force Washington to include Korean partners in any U.S.-led Saudi project.
What’s at stake for Korea
If the U.S. wins the Saudi contract, it could clash with the earlier U.S.-Korea agreement. Korea has little power to challenge the U.S. and may lose the Saudi market. reactors over its own when bidding for the project.
Saudi Arabia aims to build 16 reactors by 2030 to reduce oil reliance. Efficient delivery is key. Korea’s UAE track record positions it well. However, the U.S.-Saudi deal may favor American firms, even if the U.S. still needs Korean help.
A senior nuclear industry source, speaking anonymously, said if the AP1000 is chosen, Korea will feel cheated. The Westinghouse-Korea relationship is described as unequal, leaving Korea little choice but to lose Saudi access.
Global competition in the nuclear market
Russia and China lead the global nuclear reactor export market. Russia operates 34 reactors with 5 more under construction. China operates 60 reactors and has 37 more under construction. However, diplomatic tensions and design issues may prevent the U.S. from working with either on the Saudi project.
France is another possible partner, but its costs are much higher. France’s per-kilowatt cost is $7,931, compared to $3,571 for Korea. This high cost and weak delivery performance make it less attractive. Saudi Arabia will likely choose firms that can deliver affordably and efficiently — a role Korea has already filled.
A future where U.S. and Korea may still work together
Despite the new U.S.-Saudi agreement, the U.S. may still need Korean companies for large-scale projects. No other firm has Korea’s track record of delivering on time and within budget. This gives Korea a unique position, even if it loses direct Saudi access. The challenge is to remain a key partner despite the loss.
While the U.S. gains visibility, execution will still depend on Korean firms. The next years will show whether this partnership can last or if Korea must find new opportunities.
The implications for the global nuclear landscape
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal could shift the global market. If the U.S. wins Saudi contracts, it might signal a change from traditional leaders. However, the U.S. will still need Korean support for major projects, limiting the deal’s impact.
This situation tests the balance between U.S. goals and Korean capabilities. Korea’s success in the UAE proves it can be trusted for big projects, even with the U.S.-Saudi deal.
Conclusion: A fragile balance
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal offers American firms more visibility but does not solve the execution issue. Korean companies remain the most reliable and cost-effective partners for big projects. The U.S. may gain a stronger position in Saudi Arabia but will still need Korean help to deliver reactors and manage the supply chain.
This dynamic leaves Korea in a tough spot. It can’t stop the U.S. from winning the contract but may still need to support the project. The next months will determine whether Korea can adapt and keep its competitive edge in the global nuclear industry.