Since the United States unveiled its nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia in early July, Turkey and Egypt have watched with a mix of relief and satisfaction. Both had previously rejected U.S. demands to commit to forgoing uranium enrichment, arguing that such limits were unfair and unnecessary. Now, with Saudi Arabia explicitly permitted a route to pursue potential weapons-grade uranium, these countries feel vindicated. What was once a diplomatic risk now appears to be a wise strategic move. Regional actors are rethinking whether nonproliferation pledges made under American influence still hold weight in a shifting global landscape.
The agreement, finalized on July 22, grants Saudi Arabia the ability to build a full uranium enrichment cycle within two years. It allows it to operate under a less intrusive inspection regime from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is a significant departure from the traditional framework. That framework requires full-scope IAEA oversight to prevent weaponization. Experts warn that this shift could inspire a new wave of nuclear interest. This interest may spread not only in the Middle East but in other regions. Energy and security concerns are colliding in those regions. The implications for nonproliferation are being closely monitored.
Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association in Washington, emphasizes a broader trend. “More states are hedging their bets,” she says. They believe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella — the long-standing promise of American security support — may no longer be as reliable. She notes that this uncertainty is compounded by the lack of consistent action and leadership on nonproliferation. Key nuclear powers are showing this lack. “The sense of vulnerability is driving states to prepare for worst-case scenarios. Even if they don’t immediately break international rules, this is happening.”
Energy security meets weapon ambitions
For decades, the United States has tried to balance nuclear energy development with nonproliferation goals. But recent developments suggest this balance is coming undone. The U.S. previously imposed a ban. This allowed South Korea to enrich uranium for civilian power generation. Now, Saudi Arabia’s deal could set an even wider precedent. Analysts say the current surge in global energy demand is a factor. Growing concerns about climate change and energy disruptions are also a factor. These disruptions are as seen during the war in Ukraine. They are also as seen during the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran. This is pushing more countries to look at nuclear energy as a long-term solution.
Yet the line between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is rarely far. Saudi Arabia’s ability to enrich uranium, even for civilian use, opens a technical pathway to weapons production. Analysts view the deal as a tacit approval for the kingdom to pursue this path. This has drawn the attention of regional players like Turkey and Egypt. They are well aware that a single competitor gaining nuclear capabilities could upend the region’s security balance. Their next moves could be influenced not just by economic or energy needs. It could also be by a pressing desire to maintain strategic parity.
A fading nonproliferation consensus
Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, argues that a more fundamental change is at play. “The fear of nuclear disaster has waned,” he says. That fear, once central to the post-World War II mindset, has faded. Part of the reason, he suggests, is the absence of prominent thinkers who once warned about the dangers of proliferation. “These voices have been replaced by new priorities and new generations that haven’t lived through the Cold War mindset.”
The international nonproliferation regime, once held together by a unified effort from the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members — the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., and France — is now fraying. These powers no longer act in concert to address threats of proliferation, and the lack of coordination is most evident in unstable regions like the Middle East. There, the U.S.-Saudi deal is seen as a green light for a nuclear arms race by default. Analysts argue that Washington is not directly encouraging it, but the lack of clear opposition is being interpreted as tacit approval.
Davenport refers to the current moment as a “proliferation crossroads.” She says the Saudi deal is not just a policy shift — it’s a signal that the global consensus against proliferation is weakening. “The deal can’t help but encourage more states to hedge their bets for nuclear weapons,” she says. However, the situation is further complicated by the nuclear advancements of regional powers like Iran, which is deepening its own nuclear capabilities. In this environment, the Middle East is preparing for a future in which the nuclear calculus becomes a daily calculation — not just for Saudi Arabia, but for all its neighbors.
The agreement, expected to last 30 years, aims to provide Saudi Arabia with advanced nuclear technology and greater regional prestige. It also allows the Kingdom to replace oil-fired power with atomic energy, freeing more crude for export. For Washington, the deal helps maintain Saudi nuclear programs within its sphere of influence and supports the U.S. nuclear industry. However, no reactor designs or suppliers have yet been selected. President Donald Trump, in response to backlash over the July 22 deal, conditioned it on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and reiterated that Riyadh would not be allowed to enrich uranium. Many observers argue the deal lowers U.S. non-proliferation standards and creates a precedent with consequences beyond the region.
The agreement includes a two-year joint study on the commercial viability of uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, which is justified by its uranium reserves despite assessments deeming exploitation uneconomic. If viable, the U.S. could build a 'black box' enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, otherwise a 10-year moratorium on enrichment would apply. This could slow Saudi nuclear ambitions, but the 10-year period may allow enrichment once it expires. The 'black box' model would keep sensitive technology under American control, though such proposals have long existed without traction in Saudi Arabia, which insists on developing enrichment capabilities.
The deal also includes a bilateral safeguards arrangement to be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors, offering an alternative to Saudi Arabia adopting the Additional Protocol. This raises concerns due to potential verification gaps, as the agreement may apply only to certain facilities. Saudi Arabia has previously objected to the AP on the grounds that it could allow non-Muslim inspectors into Islamic holy sites. It also argues that requiring the AP while Israel possesses nuclear weapons under no comparable safeguards constitutes a double standard. The AP is viewed by Riyadh as a constraint on nuclear activities and is associated with the intrusive inspections imposed on Iraq after its Gulf War defeat.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Act, specifically Section 123, requires recipients to accept non-proliferation commitments before receiving nuclear technology. The central concern is the possibility of permitting Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without ratifying the AP. While the IAEA would remain involved in oversight, it would not have the same level of access as under the AP. The adoption of the AP has become an international benchmark for effective safeguards, and there has long been bipartisan U.S. support for requiring it as a condition for nuclear cooperation agreements.
The nuclear cooperation deal between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is thus seen as not just a matter of energy development but also of strategic autonomy. While Saudi Arabia justifies enrichment for civilian purposes, the agreement’s lack of comprehensive safeguards and potential precedent-setting nature raise concerns about future proliferation risks. As global nonproliferation norms appear to be weakening, the region is preparing for a future where nuclear capabilities will play an increasing role in regional security dynamics.