Eurasian Pipelines Reshape Taiwan Deterrence Calculus

Strategic focus is shifting from maritime chokepoints to continental energy corridors, altering the landscape of U.S.-China competition.
Strategic planning in Washington has long prioritized the Indo-Pacific, focusing on naval capabilities in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. However, emerging analysis suggests that the next phase of great power competition may unfold primarily across the Eurasian landmass. According to a report from War on the Rocks, this shift involves a move toward contested pipelines, swing states, and shifting alignments along routes that echo the historic Silk Road. This continental dimension represents a critical vulnerability and opportunity that differs significantly from traditional maritime concerns.
Beijing has long viewed its dependence on seaborne energy as a strategic weakness, particularly regarding the Strait of Malacca. Through this narrow waterway, a significant majority of China’s oil imports pass. The concern is that in a conflict scenario, the United States could exploit this dependency to constrain China’s economic and military options. To mitigate this risk, Chinese strategists have pursued a multi-dimensional transportation network that bypasses Southeast Asian chokepoints, relying instead on overland routes through Central Asia and Russia. This infrastructure development is not merely about trade efficiency; it is a deliberate effort to reduce susceptibility to Western influence in non-peacetime conditions.
Overland Routes Reduce Maritime Vulnerability
Chinese academic discourse on this issue dates back to the mid-2000s. Scholar Zhang Jie explicitly connected China’s energy security in the Strait of Malacca to its freedom of action regarding Taiwan. She argued that while projects like the Kra Isthmus canal or Myanmar pipelines offered some relief, they did not eliminate the possibility of intervention by major powers. Instead, she advocated for strengthened energy cooperation with Central Asia and Russia. These overland routes were seen as possessing greater strategic significance during crises, offering a degree of security that maritime routes could not guarantee. This perspective has since been realized through substantial infrastructure investments.
Today, much of the envisioned infrastructure is operational. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan currently transports a substantial volume of natural gas annually, with plans to expand its capacity significantly. Additionally, proposed agreements with Russia for further pipeline capacity could allow China to substitute a large share of its imported liquefied natural gas with overland supply. This shift is critical because it alters the cost-benefit analysis for Beijing. Greater confidence in withstanding maritime disruption could embolden China to take greater risks in regional disputes, fundamentally changing the deterrence dynamic that the United States and its allies must navigate.
Implications for U.S. Strategic Focus
For the United States, this development highlights a potential blind spot in current strategic thinking. While maritime power remains essential, an overemphasis on naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific may overlook the growing importance of continental stability. The ability of China to source energy through land routes reduces the leverage that maritime control provides. Consequently, Washington must broaden its understanding of U.S.-Chinese competition to include the diplomatic and economic dimensions of Eurasian energy security. Ignoring this continental strategy risks misjudging the extent to which Beijing is willing to challenge the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
The geopolitical landscape is thus becoming more complex, with the center of gravity shifting from the sea to the steppe and the pipeline networks that traverse it. As the material from the GN auto geopolitics/asia-pacific: South China Sea desk notes, the next phase of deterrence requires a dual understanding of both maritime and continental strategies. Policymakers must consider how the resilience of overland energy networks influences Beijing’s risk tolerance. The forward question remains how Washington will adjust its alliances and infrastructure investments to counter this continental shift effectively.






