Sudan and Ethiopia Face Rising Risk of Proxy Conflict
Tensions between Khartoum and Addis Ababa are escalating as internal wars begin to intersect, creating a volatile environment in the Horn of Africa that defies traditional interstate war models.
The likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Sudan and Ethiopia has risen significantly in 2026, according to assessments from the Robert Lansing Institute. While a deliberate, full-scale interstate invasion remains constrained by the fact that both governments are already engaged in major internal conflicts, the danger is shifting toward conflict convergence. This process involves the gradual merging of the Sudanese civil war, Ethiopia’s internal instability, and unresolved territorial disputes over Al-Fashaga.
Relations between the two nations deteriorated sharply in May 2026 after Khartoum accused Addis Ababa of facilitating drone operations by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Ethiopia denied these allegations, instead accusing Sudan of supporting destabilizing forces. Sudan recalled its ambassador, and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officials described the alleged Ethiopian involvement as an act of aggression. According to the GN auto geopolitics/africa: Sudan conflict report, these events mark a significant shift in regional dynamics.
Emerging Regional Alignments
A dangerous system of opposing alignments is developing in the region. One side features an emerging axis centered on the Ethiopian federal government and the RSF, with the United Arab Emirates playing a significant regional role. The opposing constellation involves the SAF, Eritrea, elements of the Tigrayan movement, and Egypt. These groups share interests in opposing different aspects of Addis Ababa’s regional policy.
These alignments should not be viewed as formal military alliances, as their interests frequently diverge. However, they create the infrastructure for proxy warfare. The most plausible escalation pathway is not a direct state-on-state war, but rather a sequence of proxy conflicts leading to cross-border strikes and subsequent retaliation. This makes the Sudan-Ethiopia frontier a critical point where multiple wars in the Horn of Africa could intersect.
Constraints on Conventional War
Military capacity remains the principal constraint on a full-scale interstate war. The SAF is fighting the RSF across Sudan, while Ethiopia’s National Defense Force must manage renewed instability in Tigray and confront the Fano insurgency in Amhara. Neither government has a strong incentive to open another major conventional front, as both are stretched thin by their respective internal conflicts.
However, limited capacity for conventional war creates stronger incentives to use proxies, intelligence networks, and deniable military assistance. This approach makes escalation harder to control and increases the risk of unintended conflict. The distinction between separate national crises is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as the military landscapes in both countries fragment.
Forward Looking Indicators
Observers should watch for signs of proxy escalation, such as increased cross-border armed group activity or logistics corridor disruptions. The risk of limited military confrontation is assessed as high and rising, while the risk of deliberate full-scale war is lower but no longer negligible. The central transformation is that two civil wars are beginning to intersect, creating a volatile environment that requires careful monitoring.
