Nativism Persists Regardless of Migrant Numbers

Election results in Germany and Spain suggest that nativist mobilization is driven by political framing rather than the actual demographic presence of foreign residents.
Recent electoral outcomes in Saxony-Anhalt and parts of Spain challenge the common assumption that nativist sentiment is directly proportional to the number of foreign residents in a region. According to analysis by GN geopolitics/migration (en-US), the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) secured a record 43.8 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, a state with one of the lowest shares of foreign residents in Germany. This result occurred despite the fact that strong nativist mobilization is also evident in areas with significantly higher foreign populations, indicating that the mere presence of migrants is not the sole driver of this political shift.
The contrast with Spain highlights the complexity of the issue. In El Ejido, a municipality in Almería where foreign residents constitute roughly one-third of the population, the Vox party achieved a vote share of 31.4 percent in recent regional elections. This figure significantly outpaced its regional average, despite the high level of daily interaction between native and foreign communities. The parallel between a region with low migrant density and one with high density suggests that the underlying grievances are being channeled into similar political targets regardless of the local demographic context.
Demographic Presence Does Not Predict Nativist Support
Observers have long noted that the AfD’s strength in Saxony-Anhalt coincides with a low foreign resident share of approximately eight percent. This has led to the interpretation that the party’s appeal stems from a lack of contact with migrants, effectively blaming an absent or invisible 'other' for local economic or social declines. However, this logic fails to account for the Spanish case, where high proximity to foreign workers correlates with strong support for Vox. If scarcity of migrants generated fear, one would expect lower nativist support in areas of high integration and contact, yet the opposite appears to be true in El Ejido.
Research cited in the material indicates that depopulation alone does not necessarily drive radical-right voting in Spain, nor does migrant presence explain it uniformly. Instead, the data points to a constructed political narrative where the target of criticism is supplied by the party rather than derived from the specific local grievance. Whether the complaint is about economic abandonment in rural Germany or labor competition in agricultural Spain, the political response converges on a nativist core that defines an in-group against an out-group.
Political Framing Overrides Local Grievances
The phenomenon is further complicated by shifts in party alliances and voter identity. In Catalonia, for instance, support is moving between parties such as Vox and Junts, with a significant portion of sympathizers aligning with Aliança Catalana. This fluidity suggests that the 'nation' or in-group definition is interchangeable and politically malleable. Both Vox and Aliança operate on similar nativist principles, despite potentially different national projects, demonstrating that the emotional and political appeal of restriction is more stable than the specific ideological label attached to it.
This dynamic implies that reducing migration flows may not diminish the reservoir of nativist support. If very different local grievances can accept the same culprit, then the political utility of migration as a scapegoat is independent of the actual scale of migration. The arrangement itself—a constructed native in-group and an available outsider—survives the substitution of different demographic realities. This suggests that policy measures focused solely on border control may be insufficient to address the broader political mobilization.
Forward Implications for Electoral Politics
As Germany prepares for further elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the strategic implications of these findings become critical. Political parties across the spectrum are grappling with how to respond to a nativist surge that appears resilient to demographic counter-arguments. The key variable to watch is not the number of migrants, but the ability of mainstream parties to offer alternative narratives of security and identity that do not rely on exclusion.
The coming months will test whether nativist movements can sustain their momentum in areas of high integration, potentially breaking the perceived link between contact and support. If the trend continues, it will confirm that the driver of nativism is a political technology of blame rather than a sociological reaction to diversity. Stakeholders should monitor voter registration trends and cross-party defection rates as indicators of this underlying shift in political allegiance.






